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Abstract: 
This article contributes to the debates surrounding ‘New African Economic 
History’ by exploring the feasibility of constructing a time series of economic 
growth in Nigeria spanning the 20
th
 century. Currently most datasets for African 
economies only go back to 1960. The sources for their creation exist, but these 
valuable colonial data remain underutilized. This is a first exploratory paper in a 
project aiming to create measures of economic growth through the 20
th
 century 
for a sample of African economies. The paper offers a systematic discussion of 
the different available datasets on population, agricultural production and income 
for the country. It finds that the existing data, often presented as facts, are more 
accurately described as projections based on assumptions. If these assumptions 
are already made in the production of the data, this precludes empirical testing of 
important questions. The main lesson is that any African economic history 
investigation must both begin and end with a critical analysis of the quantitative 
data, and must further be supported by careful qualitative evaluation. 
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Controversy, Facts and Assumptions: Lessons from Estimating 
Long Term Growth in Nigeria, 1900–2007
1
 
“Avanti, Economic historians!” sounded the call from Patrick Manning to African 
economic historians in 1987.2 But instead of surging ahead, the discipline arguably went into 
decline.3 The history of economic development in Africa became almost exclusively an exercise 
for development economists, while historians focussed on other topics. Until recently, most 
economists working on Africa took 1960 as their starting point, primarily because data on 
national income and similar derivates are only available back to this point. However, during the 
past ten years there has been a surge in quantitative research on African development. In 
particular, attempts have been made to establish relationships between historical events and 
current income levels and inequalities.4 This earlier neglect of the colonial and pre-colonial 
periods in the economic development literature is therefore increasingly being seen as a 
limitation; it does not allow an analysis of the historical roots of poverty or an evaluation of the 
causes of persistent slow growth in Africa. For this research agenda to be fruitful and/or its 
theories substantiated, it is crucial to have consistent and reliable estimates of economic change. 
The sources for the creation of long-term datasets on African economies exist, but these valuable 
colonial data remain underutilized.  
This paper contributes to the ‘New African Economic History’ by exploring the prospects 
of creating a time series of economic growth across the colonial and the post-colonial period in 
the case of Nigeria. Nigeria is today the most populous African country and arguably also the 
                                                          
1
 This paper was presented at the African Economic History workshop at LSE in April 2010, at the History and 
Economic Development Group workshop at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS) in June 2010 and at African Studies Association Meetings at Oxford, August 2010. I am grateful for 
excellent research assistance provided by Sabiha Jukic, Gerardo Serra, Jake Madison and Pierre Nguemkeu. This 
work is part of a three year project “Measuring African progress: Validity and reliability of African statistics and the 
study of African long term development” supported by a 3 year Standard Research Grant from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 
2 Manning, “Prospects for African Economic History.” 
3 Hopkins, “New African Economic History”. 
4
 For recent reviews see: Jerven, “African Growth Recurring”; Austin, “Compression of History”; Hopkins, “New 
African Economic History”; and Fenske, “The causal history of Africa”. 
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most important economy in the region apart from South Africa. Thus the lessons learnt in the 
case of Nigeria are likely to be very relevant for similar efforts focusing on other African and 
non-Western economies. The paper has two main parts. The first part establishes the extent of 
our current ignorance regarding economic change in Nigeria. The paper offers a systematic 
discussion of the different available datasets on population, agricultural production and income 
for the country. The second part of the paper discusses a method for measurement of economic 
change in Nigeria through the 20
th
 century.  
In the first part of the paper, it is found that the existing data, often presented as facts, are 
more accurately described as projections based on assumptions. These assumptions are often of 
great theoretical significance, such as whether the marginal productivity of labour in agriculture 
is zero or whether the relationship between informal and formal sector growth is elastic or 
inelastic. If such assumptions are already made in the production of the data it precludes 
empirical testing of these important questions. It is discussed which assumptions made by data 
compilers have general support in the scholarly literature on Nigerian development, and whether 
there is reason to think that the basic conditions for these assumptions change in the course of the 
20
th
 century.  
The data presented in the second part of the paper have been assembled using primary 
sources such as colonial reports and Blue Books produced by the colonial administrations, 
combined with annual abstracts and digests of statistics produced by the Federal Office of 
Statistics and bulletins from the Central Bank of Nigeria. For many years, statistical abstracts 
either were not published on a regular basis or were not available in library collections. The time 
series presented here have been assembled after intensive use of libraries in North America, 
collections in the United Kingdom and finally the libraries at the Federal Office of Statistics and 
the Central Bank of Nigeria, both in Abuja, Nigeria. In some cases the data collection burden has 
been eased by the use of secondary literature rich in data appendices.5  
The paper is exploratory in nature, and while it has succeeded to assert some trends and 
developments with the use of quantitative data, the main lesson is that any African economic 
                                                          
5
 The work of Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria; Helleiner, Economic Growth in Nigeria and Falola, 
Modernization in Nigeria deserves particular mention in this respect.  
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history investigation must both begin and end with a critical analysis of the quantitative data, and 
must further be supported by careful qualitative evaluation. The quest for quantitative resolution 
must be enriched with qualitative rigour.6 
Facts, Controversy And Assumptions 
This part of the paper proceeds to look at the controversy that surrounds estimating total 
population and population growth in Nigeria, before it considers the problems of estimating 
agricultural productivity trends in both the long and short term. Finally, the major changes in the 
methodology and sources in accounting for national income in Nigeria since 1951 are surveyed. 
Observations are is based on reading primary documents on data collection in Nigeria, a careful 
investigation of competing datasets and observations made during interviews conducted during a 
visit to the Federal Office of Statistics and National Population Commission in Abuja, Nigeria, 
February 2010. 
Population Estimates 
The basic starting point when estimating either total income or trends in growth is a count 
of the population. It has been the practice of economic historians to turn to estimates of 
population growth, size or densities in the absence of data on economic growth or income 
levels.7 Similarly, a standard method at national accounting offices in Sub-Saharan Africa is to 
use population data for the sectors of the economy for which data is not regularly collected.8 
Thus, for the informal sector and for subsistence production estimates, level estimates may be 
made using a per capita amount to account for these contributions to the national economy. 
Additionally, for these and other sectors, growth is often assumed to be proportional to 
population growth. Finally, population data is of course the central ingredient in the most 
conventional measure of development: real per capita income. Thus, data on population are vital 
for the measurement of development.  
                                                          
6
 Harriss, “The Case for Cross-Disciplinary Approaches”.  
7
 Like for instance in Jones, “Recurring Growth” or Acemoglu et al., “Reversal of Fortune”. 
8
 Jerven, “Random Growth” and Jerven “Measuring the Progress of African Economies”.  
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Unfortunately, the process of counting the total population in Nigeria has been subject to 
massive controversy and difficulty. Today, we are still left guessing about the size of the total 
population; in particular, we know very little about its growth rate. The history of census-taking 
in Nigeria is an instructive example of measurement problems in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also a 
powerful lens through which we can see the history of the legitimacy of the Nigerian colonial 
and post-colonial state. 
The first population census, held by colonial authorities in 1866, only covered Lagos. 
Following suit, consecutive censuses in 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 also only covered Lagos and 
its immediate surroundings. In 1911, the census additionally covered Southern Nigeria (which 
merged with the Lagos colony in 1906). In 1921, the first census that in theory covered the 
whole territory which today is called Nigeria was held. In practice however, enumeration outside 
of cities in the South and in the North was not rigorous.  
Locust swarms in the North and tax riots in the southeast (Aba, Onisha and Owerri) 
disrupted the following 1931 census. Actual enumeration only took place in Lagos, five other 
townships and in 201 villages in northern Nigeria. The final population estimate was made using 
tax records.9 In her analysis, Hill has suggested that the estimates for 1931 were as much as 75 
percent too low; indeed, the population in the North was probably around 20 million rather than 
the 11 million that the census yielded.10  
The most serious problems for contemporary measurements and analysis arose with the 
discontinuity surrounding colonial rule and independence. Between the population census held 
by the colonial authorities in 1953 and the population census held in 1962, Nigeria gained 
independence. In 1953, the Nigerian population correctly anticipated that the census would form 
the basis for estimating tax receipts. We can safely assume that there was a significant 
downwards bias of measurement in the 1953 census. In 1962, the situation was the opposite, and 
again Nigerians probably assessed the situation correctly. The 1962 census would provide the 
foundation for federal development expenditure and investment, and most importantly, the 
                                                          
9
 Okolo, “The Nigerian Census,” p. 322. 
10
 Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty, p. 18. 
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census would be the primary basis for future voting and the distribution of representational seats 
in the federal assembly.  
The result was a high population count. In particular the relative size—and thus political 
power—of the North and the South was heavily contested by political parties.11 The 1962 census 
was finally rejected by the government, led by the Northern People Congress, and another census 
was commissioned the following year. These published 1963 population figures were again 
heavily discredited by southern politicians (represented by National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons) and, according to the historian Toyin Falola, widely considered to be fraudulent.12 
The census results for 1973 were also rejected and considered illegitimate.13 No census was held 
during the military rule of the 1980s. Generally, in the post-colonial period the 1963 figures were 
used for planning purposes, and a growth rate of 2.5 percent from a 1963 base was adopted until 
1976, when the assumed population growth rate was adjusted to 3.2 percent.14 
A new census was proposed for 1991 as part of the return to civil rule by the Babangida 
regime.15 Conscious of the past problems, this census was preceded by a publicity campaign and 
was well-funded by foreign donors.16 The resulting count put the total population as low as 88 
million. This would imply a very low population growth in the post-colonial period if the 1963 
or 1973 data are used as a base year. The World Bank did not accept this low estimate and still 
reports 99.9 million for 1991.  
The most recent census was planned for 2001—the Nigerian constitution decrees that 
they should be held at 10 year intervals—but, due to the transition from military to civilian rule, 
it was heavily delayed, finally being held in 2006. The preparation for the 2006 census was 
rigorous. A Census Awareness Study was prepared which indicated that about one third of the 
population would not trust the numbers provided by the census. In southern regions there was a 
                                                          
11
 For a basic introduction to the political rivalry between ‘South’ and ‘North’ see Forrest, Politics and Economic 
Development. 
12
 Falola and Heaton, History of Nigeria, p 168.  
13
 Ibid, p. 186. 
14
 Okolo, “The Nigerian Census,” p. 323. 
15
 Ahonsi, “Deliberate Falsification,”. p. 561. 
16
 Mimiko “Census in Nigeria,” p. 14.  
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particular concern that, in the North, goats and cows would be counted as part of the household, 
reflecting the widespread suspicion that the North’s political leaders would temper with the 
census numbers.17  
In order to counteract the anticipated negative response, the National Population 
Commission (NPC) engaged in an advocacy effort. It took place at the federal level, informing 
members of the national assembly and ministers of the import of the census and thus gathering 
support for the exercise. The chairman of NPC made courtesy calls to state governors, while 
lower level NPC commissioners contacted local government and other traditional and political 
leaders in order to inform them and publicize the importance of the census. The NPC credited the 
relative success of the census to this public relations exercise, to a relatively more favourable 
political climate and to the fact that both “in 2006 and 1991 the census was more scientific [than 
the previous censuses]. Both were conducted according to best practice. It was more accurate, 
better conducted.”18  
Despite these efforts by the NPC the 2006 census was not executed without problems. In 
his report, the chairman of the NPC noted that “some enumerating staff deployed by the 
Commission were killed while some were assaulted and chased away during the current census 
in certain parts of the country”.19 The results were also fiercely disputed. The response from 
Nigeria's president Olusegun Obasanjo was to call “those who dispute the results ‘confusionists’, 
adding that when they saw the census didn't break the country, they sought to sow confusion. 
And he washed his hands of the issue: ‘If you like, use it, [if] you don’t like [it], leave it.’”20  
One might address similar advice to academic users when it comes to interpreting the 
record of population size and growth. Table 1 below shows the official results of the censuses 
conducted between 1911 and 2006. The data vary to a surprising degree, and consensus 
regarding ‘plausibility’ is particularly hard to reach when the data have been so fiercely 
contested politically. 
                                                          
17
 National Population Commission, Census Awareness Study. 
18
 Interviews at FOS and NPC, Abuja, Nigeria, 22–25 February 2010. 
19
 Report on the Census 2006. 
20
 Yin, “Nigerian Census Results”.  
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Table 1: Nigerian Population in Consecutive Censuses (millions) 
  1911 1921 1931 1952/53 1962 1963 1973 1991 2006 
‘North’ 8.12 10.56 11.44 16.84 22.01 29.78 51.38 47.37 n.a. 
‘South’ 7.93 8.16 8.62 13.58 23.28 25.88 28.38 41.62 n.a. 
Total 16.05 18.72 20.06 30.42 45.29 55.66 79.76 88.99 140 
Sources: R. T. I. Suberu, Federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 
2001), p. 169. Adapted from R. K. Udo, “Geography and Population Censuses in Nigeria,” in Fifty Years of 
Geography in Nigeria: The lbadan Story, ed. Olusegun Areola and Stanley I. Okafor (lbadan: lbadan University 
Press, 1998), p. 356 and the 2006 Census report. 
Table 2 below presents some implied annual population growth rates. The implied 
growth rates from 1953 to either 1962 or 1963 are both implausibly high. At face value it is 
difficult to accurately assert to what extent this is due to post-colonial over-counting versus 
colonial under-counting. The 1973 to 1991 growth rate is on the other hand implausibly low, 
which could be interpreted as a sign of over-counting in the 1962, 1963 and 1973 censuses, 
though we know that the World Bank considered the 1991 census an underestimate.21  
 
Table 2: Estimating Nigerian Population Growth in Census Intervals (%) 
From: 1911 1921 1931 1953 1953 1963 1973 1991 1911 1953 1963 
To: 1921 1931 1953 1962 1963 1973 1991 2006 2006 2006 2006 
Growth 1.55 0.69 1.91 4.52 6.23 3.66 0.61 2.31 2.31 2.92 2.17 
Sources: Table 1. Percentage growth calculated as compound growth rates between census years. 
As for the accuracy of these censuses, Hill reported that the 1952 census yielded an 
estimate for the population in Kano of 3 million, a figure that in Hill’s view should have been 
                                                          
21
 Note that the losses of human life incurred during the Civil War, sometimes referred to as the Biafran War, 1967-
70 were significant. According to Falola and Hatton in A History of Nigeria, p. 180, the excess deaths, due to 
warfare and starvation may be between 1 and 3 million, and with at least 3 million people displaced because of the 
war. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 13/2011        12 
 
closer to 4.5 million—implying an underestimation of 50 percent.22 The 1963 census did count 
the population in Kano to be 5 million, and thus could be closer to the truth. This interpretation 
rings well with Caldwell and Okanjo’s interpretation of the 1962 census: “It may well be that in 
some areas in Eastern-Nigeria there was an inflation of the population figures. But the magnitude 
of the population increases recorded is probably to be accounted for more by undercounting in 
1953 than by overstatement in 1962.”23  
Today, the National Population Commission (NPC) still suffers from a bad reputation. 
The Federal Statistical Office (FOS) and NPC remain separated institutions. Furthermore, 
according to the author’s interviews with public affairs officers at both institutions, the FOS has 
no desire to join forces with the NPC as it fears this would ruin the already fragile credibility of 
their institution, while NPC officers was expressed that the separation was a ‘shame’ since they 
were ‘sister-institutions’.24  
This section has two conclusions, one positive and the other with an agnostic, if not 
negative flavour. The history of census taking in Nigeria appears to be one of increasing 
legitimacy of the NPC and other federal state institutions. While the 1991 and 2006 censuses 
were problematic, in relative terms they can be viewed as successes. This is probably due to the 
deliberate efforts of the NPC and the federal administration, but the move towards transparency 
and democracy in Nigeria more generally has likely also contributed to this development. 
The negative conclusion is that, for the purpose of estimating population growth, this 
evidence cannot be taken at face value. This has implications for the validity of most national 
income estimates, in which population growth is the variable most resorted to when other data 
are missing. 
Measurement is not simply a technocratic exercise; the political economy in which the 
‘facts’ are embedded does matter. There is a clear trend of discontinuity in the census taking, 
from the colonial problem of evasion to the post-colonial race for inclusion. It is also a stern 
                                                          
22
 Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty. p. 18.  
23
 Caldwell and Okanjo, p. 85. 
24
 Interviews at FOS and NPC, Abuja, Nigeria, 22–25 February 2010. 
                     Controversy, Facts and Assmptions: Long Term Growth in Nigeria    13 
 
reminder of the importance and difficulty of getting ‘levels’ right, and further, that the measure 
of change can be severely distorted when the levels are biased.  
Agricultural Production 
In Planning Without Facts, a book on Nigerian development published in 1966, Stolper 
wrote that “the neglect of the subsistence production can lead to serious misunderstanding of the 
process of development and therefore to inappropriate policies and plans to accelerate 
development.”25 The problem of course was that information on this sector—in particular 
agricultural productivity—was inadequate, or entirely lacking. Because data on factor inputs and 
outputs are not generally available to development planners and national statistics compilers, the 
aggregate data they report are usually generated using assumptions and projections, often 
depending on proxies such as population growth.  
The most suspect part of the first national income estimates for Nigeria was food 
production. The data in the national accounts prepared for 1950–1957 were based on agricultural 
surveys conducted in 1955–60. In these surveys “no one area was covered more than once,” and 
“in no one year were areas in more than one region covered.”26 The surveys provided average 
yields and average acreage based on sampled households, which were then aggregated based on 
the population estimates.  
These scanty data were then projected backward and forward in time based on 
agricultural officers’ subjective reports, which varied in detail: “An occasional officer ventures a 
guess at the total acreage and yield since the previous year. Others guess at the percentage 
changes in acreage and yield since the previous year. Most restrict themselves to such remarks as 
‘average’, ‘no change’, ‘1952 plus’, ‘1954 minus’, or even ‘very poor.’”27 In the words of Pius 
Okigbo, the Nigerian economist commissioned by the Nigerian federal government to prepare 
                                                          
25
 Stolper, Planning without facts. 
26
 Helleiner, Economic Growth in Nigeria, p 392. 
27
 Okigbo, National Accounts, p, 63. 
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the national accounts for 1950–57, “it is impossible to overstate the arbitrariness of the process 
of ‘quantification.’”28 
Three decades later, in 1988, Collier examined datasets on food production in Nigeria 
with the starting point that in the 1970s and 1980s “a combination of complex events and weak 
data” had yielded incompatible analysis. Data on food crops were at this time available from four 
sources. Of these, the only one based directly on field surveys was the data published by the 
FOS. But Collier noted that these series are “frequently incredible”, in particular that they often 
were contradicted by data from agricultural development projects.29  
The data Collier obtained from Nigeria’s central bank used the same field surveys but 
reported higher yields. They “rather arbitrarily [scaled] up the FOS series for the more 
commercial crops by up to 30 percent in the belief that the FOS estimates for these crops are 
biased downwards.”30 The other two data sources at the time of Collier’s analysis were the FAO 
and the US Department of Agriculture, both of which made indirect estimates, based on 
“perceived trends in demand and imports, yielding production as a residual.” While noting that 
the data are “not being firmly based on observed production,” Collier concludes without 
justification that “these series provide the best guide to long-term trends in food production.”31 
Table 3: Figures from Competing Data Sources on Production of Major Food Crops, 
1970–82 (annual % growth) 
 FOS CBN USDA FAO 
Sorghum -0.9 1.3 -0.5 -0.5 
Yam -3.5 -1.3 1.6 ... 
Millet -0.1 2.1 -0.1 0 
Cassava -8.5 -6.5 0 2.1 
Palm Oil 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Maize -6.3 -4.3 2.5 2.5 
Rice -0.1 2.1 6.9 5.1 
Source: Collier, P. (1988), “Oil Shocks and food security in Nigeria,” International Labour Review 127(6), p. 764. 
(Based on 1985 World Bank figures.)  
                                                          
28
 Okigbo, National Accounts, p. 65. 
29
 Collier, “Oil Shocks and Food Security,” p. 762. 
30
 Collier, “Oil Shocks and Food Security,” p. 763. 
31
 Ibid. 
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Both the recent rate and the trend of growth in Nigeria’s agricultural sector have been 
issues of controversy. In “Policy Making without Facts”, an article on structural adjustment 
policies published in 1992—the title referring to Stolper’s book published almost three decades 
earlier—Mosley wrote that the lack of data had “if anything increased in relevance.”32  
According to one dataset on agricultural production, approved by the Federal Office of 
Statistics (FOS) and based on field surveys, there was negative growth in food production after 
structural adjustment programmes. Another dataset, approved by the FAO and the Central Bank 
of Nigeria, showed very rapid growth in food production. The policy implications are completely 
opposite; the first dataset implied that structural adjustment policies did not work, while the 
second implied that they were indeed effective. The problem is further compounded in that both 
conclusions could make sense economically through two different interpretations. One could 
plausibly argue that a liberalization of internal food prices, together with less competition from 
imports, led to a positive supply response. Another equally plausible interpretation would be that 
the removal of fertilizer subsidies caused a negative shift in production. 
 
Table 4: Total Food Crop Production (% growth) 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
CBN  - - - - - 14.8 1.6 9.4 1.3 
FAO 1.1 4.6 -19.5 29.9 6.7 7.0 -8.0 0.7 60.0 - 
FOS -0.4 9.1 10.6 -10.9 47.9 15.9 -35.4 41.4 5.7 - 
Source: Mosley, P. (1992), “Policy-making without facts: a note on the assessment of structural adjustment policies 
in Nigeria, 1985-1990.” African Affairs, 91, pp. 227–240. 
Table 5: Total Cash Crop Production (% growth) 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
CBN - - - - - -6.4 9.0 30.1 2.4 8.8 
FAO -1.7 -2.2 -22.4 14.9 7.6 -2.1 18.8 17.7 -1.6 - 
Source: Mosley, P. (1992), “Policy-making without facts: a note on the assessment of structural adjustment policies 
in Nigeria, 1985-1990.” African Affairs, 91, pp. 227-240. 
                                                          
32
 Mosley, “Policy Making without Facts.” 
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Mosley and Collier’s study of the 1980s shows that there is considerable doubt regarding 
data on crop production, in particular food crops. These problems have not been resolved. When 
compiling the dataset for this paper, the author discovered a major discrepancy in the crop 
statistics reported for one and the same year (193/94). A comparison of the data reported in the 
1995 Statistical Abstract and in the 1999 Statistical Abstract is shown in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6: Different Estimates for 1993/94 of Major Agricultural Crops in Nigeria 
(thousands of tons) 
 Millet 
 
Guinea 
Corn 
Ground- 
nut Beans Yam Cotton Maize Cassava Rice Melon 
Coco 
Yam 
SA 1995 3595 5413 2008 1946 15861 263 4505 17261 1303 490 2100 
SA 1999 4738 6145 893 1463 22709 214 6816 31005 2943 108 1164 
% Change 31.8 13.5 -55.5 -24.8 43.2 -18.6 51.3 79.6 125.9 -78.0 -44.6 
Sources: Statistical Abstract 1995; Statistical Abstract 1999. 
Although the discrepancies might not mean that much in the aggregate national income 
estimates, they are huge in physical terms. Fourteen million tons of cassava and 7 million tons of 
yam would make a difference and would leave a mark on the transportation, distribution and 
retail sectors in the country—not to mention in the diet of the population.33 
The FOS has been supplying data on crop production since independence. These are 
based on an estimate of acreage harvested multiplied with a yield estimate for each year, 
reportedly based on annual sample surveys. As shown in Table 6 above, between the publication 
of the 1995 and the 1999 Abstract, there was an upward revision in output data. Interestingly, the 
yield and acreage data were not adjusted accordingly. In point of fact, the yields were adjusted 
downwards while the acreage harvested remained the same, thus leaving only the totals adjusted. 
While the yields multiplied by the acreage did match up with the totals in the 1995 Abstract, they 
were far from doing so in the 1999 Abstract. Total physical production of all crops was revised 
upwards 42.8 percent, a substantial addition of more than 23 million tons of produce. As noted, 
                                                          
33
 Note that from official sources there is no data on quantities of food imports in the 1980s and 1990s. Data on 
quantities of the main exports (cocoa, groundnuts and palm) are available, and show fluctutation on a detoriating 
trend in the 1980 and 1990s. 
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the tubers yam and cassava, which are notoriously difficult to measure, accounted for 90 percent 
of this increase.  
This review of different data, claims and assumptions about Nigeria’s agricultural 
production finds a notable shift in the post-colonial period when data on food production 
increasingly become available. For the 1980s there are even several competing, contradictory 
datasets. Although for earlier periods we do only have exports data, our knowledge of 
accompanying domestic economic change remains a matter of guesswork. As noted here, in 
cases where physical production data were available, Collier rejected such survey data , 
preferring a series based on assumed relationships between food production, income and imports.  
Measuring Income in Nigeria 
Some preliminary attempts to estimate national income in Nigeria were made by Perham 
et al. before the Second World War, 34 followed by an unsuccessful and unpublished attempt by 
Isaac Dina. Beyond these “tentative and contentious exercises,” the earliest estimate of Nigerian 
national income was made by Prest and Stewart in 1952-53 for the year 1950-51.35 Their 
methods may be summarized as ambitious, building up an estimate using the output, expenditure 
and income approach. The data were far less sophisticated than the theoretical blueprint, and 86 
percent of the total estimates remained ‘unclassified’ income.  
Uncharacteristically for colonial estimates, Prest and Stewart made special allowances for 
the subsistence sector. They noted problems with applying ‘Western’ concepts and attempted to 
adjust these to better fit Nigerian conditions: “For a start, the distinction between production and 
living, the distinction between working and not working, is something reasonably tangible in the 
‘West’; it is often nebulous in Nigeria.”36 A striking diversion from conventional methods was 
their inclusion of intra-household services in the estimates. Prest and Stewart even calculated the 
value of procreation services, as provided by wives to husbands. Data on bride wealth was used 
to proxy the market value for this intra-household service.  
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Equally striking, when the World Bank prepared estimates for the Nigerian Economy for 
1952-53 and 1956-57, they used the methods of Prest and Stewart.37 Job points out the oddity of 
this at a time when the 1952 UN Standard of National Accounts was the methodology choice.38  
In 1962, national accounts for Nigeria were published for the period 1950-57 based on a 
study by Okigbo. These accounts were extended to 1962-63 by the FOS and published in the 
National Development plan. Okigbo estimates GDP more than 15 percent lower than the 
estimates of Prest and Stewart.39 As seen in table 7 this was caused mainly by the different 
valuations of forestry and building production, while the controversial ‘intra-household services’ 
component did not have a major effect on the aggregate.  
 
Table 7: Two Sources’ estimates of GCP in Nigeria, 1950 (£million) 
 Prest-Stewart Okigbo 
Agriculture 295.9 285.7 
Livestock products 30.5 37.9 
Forest products 74.9 7.5 
Fishing 6.3 6.3 
Transport and communications 22.9 24.9 
Minerals 7.8 5.5 
Manufactures 0.8 2.7 
Public utilities 1.6 0.6 
Craft industries 8.6 15.8 
Building and civil engineering 41.6 8.1 
Banks, insurance and other professions 0.9 0.7 
Missions 2.2 3.4 
Domestic service 2.9 2.6 
Miscellaneous services 6.4 0.7 
Government 19.2 10.8 
Marketing Boards  --  35.5 
Ownership of buildings 5.1 5.9 
Intra-household services 4  --  
Land clearance by peasants  --  3.5 
Distribution  65.1 54.2 
Total 596.7 512.3 
Sources: Prest, A. R., and I. G. Stewart. The National Income of Nigeria, Colonial Office, Colonial Research Studies 
No. 11. London: HMSO, 1953; Okigbo, Pius N. C. Nigerian National Accounts, 1950–57. Enugu: Government 
Printer, 1962. 
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Helleiner wrote in 1966 that “the Nigerian national accounts remain in a sorry condition,” 
and that the changes in the estimation procedures made comparisons for the early years 
“unsuitable”. Nevertheless, he concluded, with a touch of positive spin, that “the estimates 
inevitably involve so wide a margin of error that the lack of consistency in the aggregates need 
not to be viewed so seriously.”40  
No revisions to the methods and data basis were made before a team led by Professor O. 
Aboyade finally completed a revision; their report was published in 1981. The report noted that 
when the Second National Development Plan 1970-74 was drawn up, the latest income estimates 
available for the planners were for the year 1966, just before a destructive and long civil war.41 
The primary purpose of this Development plan was supposedly to address the consequences of 
this civil war—a difficult task considering the dearth of data on the national economy post-civil 
war.42 Aboyade observed that “a number of critical estimates were based on highly tenuous 
assumptions,” and that, for instance, the estimate for the contribution of transport and trade was 
“based on the long standing but unverified assumption that distributive activities always account 
for one-eighth of Nigeria’s gross domestic product.”43 The report recounted some improvements 
and inherent weaknesses but stressed that an inherent weakness of this revision and of earlier 
ones was that it was an ad hoc revision; the team recruited to complete it would likely disperse, 
and with it the value of the work contributed.44 The final paragraph of the official report is worth 
quoting in full, because it is uniquely candid about the shortcomings of statistical methods: 
Our experience has shown that in a setting where weights and measures are amorphous 
and in a highly variegated landscape with contrasting political geography, the more 
mundane nuts and bolts approach of the economic anthropologist may advance the course 
of development of economic statistics more than the sophisticated discourses of the 
systems designer and sampling theorist.45 
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A further report, on the 1990 revision, was published in 1992. It recounted the methods 
which most likely are representative of current practices at the FOS. Agricultural estimates relied 
on annual survey data, while the export data were compiled with figures from the Central Bank.46 
Estimates for manufacturing were made using a physical output index multiplied with the 
estimate for 1981. On the transport sector, it was cryptically noted that “a number of assumptions 
are made to arrive at each of these components.”47 As for the estimates prepared for the 
wholesale and retail sectors, the assumptions were made clear: It was assumed that for consumer 
goods the sector increased value added by 100 percent, for capital goods 50 percent and for 
passenger cars 90 percent.48 Apart from these notes on methods, no evaluation was made of the 
general validity of the estimates, its weaknesses or the quality of the underlying data.  
A note in a statistical review from 1989 is symptomatic of the data problems of the period 
and in particular the difficulty of obtaining incontestable real data on production. The 1989 
report had an accompanying nine-page analysis of the economy; the first seven and a half of 
which focused on a discussion of the exchange rates, prices and the stock market. Under the 
headline ‘Real Production’, the report begins by saying that “we have painted a reasonable 
picture of the price domain of the economy” but that for the “real domain, especially on current 
economic conditions our data base is weak. Efforts to drastically improve the situation at FOS 
are now being developed. But by implication the real economic situation can be examined by 
relating the various discussions on prices and rates presented above to growth rates on some key 
GDP components”49 The report subsequently fails to mention any concrete data on the real 
economy, merely addressing the growth of the petroleum and public sector in general terms. 
The table below shows the availability of constant price series for the Nigerian economy 
in the post-colonial period.  
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Table 7. Available constant prices series for Nigeria, 1962–2006. 
Base Year Years Covered 
1962 1958/59-1966/67 
1962 1962/63-1973/74 
1973 1973/74-1977/78 
1977 1973/74-1981 
1984 1981-1990 
1990 1980-2006 
Sources: various national accounts files. 
According to the information gathered on a visit to the FOS in 2010, the base year for the 
constant price series is still 1990, and the 1993 SNA is still to be implemented. There was a 
recent revision of the basic data undertaken during 2004 in collaboration with the IMF: “We did 
some compilations with some copious data and compared it with the 2003 estimates. There was a 
huge jump from 2003 to 2004.”50 The national accountants were advised by the IMF consultant 
to smooth the series and, rather than accepting a break in the series, to splice the upward revision 
in backwards. Following this advice, the FOS series gives an impression of growth for the period 
up to 2004 that may be not justified,, and there is no report confirming that these data were 
added. Thus the method for revising the estimates is wholly nontransparent. In order to complete 
these kinds of revisions, the FOS are dependent on funds from donors, a situation which they 
conceded was unfortunate.51 Heston suggested, in a survey of national income problems in 1994, 
that “often officials who use national accounts for growth purposes.…may resist improvements 
in level estimates of output because it will introduce breaks in national accounts series.”52 Here 
the present author found that the revision of the level estimate had been approved, but rather than 
accepting a break in the series, smoothing is applied.53  
In 2010, at the Federal Office of Statistics in Abuja, Nigeria, the national accounting 
team was confronted with copies of both Mosley’s article and Stolper’s book, which claims that 
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data users were “without facts”. Their response was to suggest that data users often complain 
about a lack of availability without knowing what data are available. Asked to comment on the 
availability of competing facts, it was noted that the desirable situation would be “one data for 
one country”, and that recently CBN, the Ministries and the FOS, have been collaborating to 
ensure this in practice as planned in the National Strategy for the Development of Statistics.54 
What do the aggregate growth patterns in Nigeria look like according to the available 
sources? Studies of growth estimates across different sources have shown significant 
inconsistencies in the case of other countries. Jerven shows that interspatial and intertemporal 
comparisons of growth and income depend on which data source is used.55 Johnson et al. reveal a 
large difference between versions of the Penn World Table, and Ciccone and Jarocinski 
demonstrate that this variation affects which growth determinants turn out to be statistically 
significant. At the aggregate level, there are a range of data providers. Figure 1 shows the 
aggregate growth reported by Penn World Tables, Angus Maddison, World Development 
Indicators and the various series published by Nigeria’s Federal Office of Statistics. 
Figure 1: Aggregate Growth in Nigeria, 1950–2007 (annual % growth in GDP) 
 
Sources: FOS: Nigeria National Account Files, WDI: World Development Indicators 2010, PWT: Penn World 
Tables Heston A., Summers R. and. Aten B (2006) and Maddison: Angus Maddison (2009) and Okigbo (1962). 
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The sources agree to a surprising extent. This is surprising in several respects. Studies of 
other countries have shown that controversy surrounding revisions, underlying population data 
and choice of time series data has led to disagreements among reported data on economic 
growth.56 The level of discrepancy between population estimates and agricultural productivity in 
Nigeria would lead one to expect disagreements between datasets on economic growth. The 
sheer importance of the Nigerian economy to Sub-Saharan growth comparisons might mean that 
there has been more rigour in ensuring coherence among datasets on national income in the 
databases. Most importantly though, the aggregate growth rate refers to the total economy. The 
population growth rate does not figure directly in the measure reported here. Finally, the 
importance of crop data on yams and cassava might be important for policy decisions, but for the 
aggregate growth rate in Nigeria what matters is petroleum—for which we have relatively good 
data. The problem is to deflate the values of the exports correctly. An IMF report prepared in 
1998 commented extensively on accounting for the changes in the oil prices in the national 
accounts and recommended adjustments. It would appear these have been recognized in all 
datasets.57 
Figure 2 reports the highest and lowest growth rate reported by any source for each year. 
This tempers the impression of consensus on Nigerian growth somewhat. With the exception of a 
few years with large discrepancy, the data from Maddison track the FOS national accounts data 
extremely closely until 1970s.. Similarly, the data from World Bank and those reported by the 
FOS are close in the early period, while there is disagreement in the 1980s. A similar pattern is 
repeated with Penn World Tables; however, the very large discrepancies in the last decade are 
driven by abnormally high reported growth rates in the Penn World dataset. From the 1970s 
onwards disagreement is the rule, and often the difference between maximum and minimum 
growth rates observed are in double digits.  
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Figure 2: Minimum and maximum annual GDP growth rates reported for Nigeria,  
1950–2007 (%) 
 
Sources: FOS: Nigeria National Account Files, WDI: World Development Indicators 2010, PWT: Penn World 
Tables Heston A., Summers R. and. Aten B (2006) and Maddison: Angus Maddison (2009) and Okigbo (1962). 
The comparison of growth between sources and the difficulties of getting proper 
international price parity estimates for levels may be very important.58 Yet, in the case of Nigeria, 
to focus on these problems would be to sidestep the main issue; that is, how well the physical 
data observations relate to the actual patterns of economic change in the country.  
This review has already shown that two things we know very little about in Nigeria are 
population and agricultural production.59 Indeed, the answer to factual questions regarding total 
size and/or rate of growth will critically depend on subjective judgments or the origin of the 
dataset used to answer the question. The numbers that support analysis of these trends are 
malleable, and the facts that are available are often more an expression of assumed relationships 
rather than raw data that can be used to test assumed relationships. 
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Moreover, all observations are subject to errors. These can be due to incompatible 
theoretical definitions with Nigerian actual economic conditions, insufficient economic resources 
and personnel to accurately survey economic data and finally political bias and pressures on 
those supplying facts for development. Patterns of economic change in Nigeria are subject to 
controversy. A recurring lament in development economists’ work on the economy of Nigeria 
has been the lack of facts. We have seen that the problem is not this simple; indeed there is a 
cacophony of numbers and competing interpretations of them. According to Maddison, the 
leading scholar on historical national accounts, “quantification clarifies issues which qualitative 
analysis leave fuzzy.”60 Nigeria might very well be a case where the opposite is true. 
Comparing Colonial and Post-Colonial Output: A Proposed Method of 
Estimating Long-term Changes in Income 
The first part of this paper established the extent of our knowledge regarding economic 
change in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It has been argued here that, due to measurement 
problems and contradictory data, the most prudent course of action may be to plead ignorance 
regarding population growth and agricultural productivity. This has far-reaching implications. It 
means that the most important indicators for assessing the evolution in living standards are 
missing. It further implies that any level estimates, as measured in per capita income, are futile 
and most probably grossly misleading. 
In this part of the paper it is therefore suggested that, since there are fairly reliable data on 
exports, imports and government expenditure/revenue for the whole period, the best option for 
quantitative analysis is to create a consistent dataset of these measures across the 20
th
 century. 
What is suggested is a measure of the rate of change in formal markets. The advantage of this 
method is that it explicitly takes the data limitations into consideration. Based on the information 
in the first part of this paper, it can be argued that the conventional indicator of development – 
per capita income – is unreliable and unsuitable. Any level estimate would be subject to a range 
of obscure assumptions, and the data basis for the level estimates is changing over time, thereby 
biasing the change estimates.  
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In the available official GDP estimates, whether those published by governments or those 
available in international datasets, it is only the information on government expenditures, large 
commercial firms and imports and exports that is available and reliable. The remainder is subject 
to assumptions and ad hoc measures. In those published estimates it is not transparent what these 
assumptions are, whether they change over time or whether they are consistent from country to 
country. One component in the national accounts, most often referred to today as the ‘informal 
economy’, is largely unrecorded. Indeed, while there are many competing misnomers for this 
sector, such as ‘subsistence’ or ‘traditional’ in addition to ‘informal’, the best definition of this 
economic activity is that it is not recorded and thus not taxed or otherwise monitored by the state. 
Unrecorded does of course not mean unimportant or insignificant to historical arguments of 
economic change. In the estimator suggested here, this important part of the economy will be 
treated as an unknown quantity, ‘X’. 
What can data on exports, imports and government expenditure/revenue tell us about 
development? It is probably best conceived as a measure of the state’s capacity to capture 
economic rents, and the ability of producers to participate in external markets.  
Data and Method 
This exercise has two aims. It presents some preliminary, pioneering steps towards 
creating a growth time-series covering the entire 20
th
 century for a Sub-Saharan African 
economy. Thus, the first tangible and useful outcome for other future studies in African 
economic history is an overview of the availability of consistent time series data. The second aim 
is to illustrate the type of bare-bone growth estimates that can be created from a rather limited 
data basis. The method has been devised to rely as far as possible only on ‘recorded growth’ and 
to minimize the assumptions while making these as clear as possible.  
The most obvious option is to use the ‘Expenditure approach’, given the structure and the 
availability of the colonial data in the Blue Books. Therefore,  
GDP = Household consumption expenditure + Government expenditure + Gross 
capital formation + Exports of goods and service – Imports of goods and services  
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However, neither Household consumption expenditures nor Gross capital formation data 
are available. Estimates can therefore only use direct data for Government expenditure, Exports 
and Imports. To neglect capital formation will introduce a considerable negative bias in the 
growth indicator. We could estimate gross capital formation, using some components of Imports.  
For household consumption expenditure we will assume that food is the most important 
item, and while food expenditure was certainly supplemented by imported commodities, the 
lion’s share was probably either self-produced or purchased in domestic markets in economic 
activities not recorded by colonial nor post-colonial governments. In this indicator, growth arises 
either as an increase in export quantities, or a relative decrease in quantities imported. Is this an 
appropriate measure of growth? Growth would result either from an increase in export volumes 
or from a reduction in import volumes for domestic consumption. The latter could be interpreted 
as successful import substitution or as a shift in the import bill towards capital goods rather than 
consumption goods. We are not picking up any growth resulting directly from food production 
for domestic consumption unless it indirectly (and proportionally) results in visible 
corresponding changes in imports.  
Data on government expenditure (and revenue) should in principle be easy to come by, 
and is usually considered to be the data with the highest reliability in African countries. Yet, it is 
indicative of data issues for Nigeria that World Development Indicators does not report any data 
at all on government revenue or expenditure for that country. The secondary literature, statistical 
abstracts and colonial reports are often in conflict with each other. Revenue and expenditure data 
are often subject to wide ranging revisions and are sometimes noted as provisional or revised in 
the publication. As late as the period 1996–2002 the Federal Office of Statistics was unable to 
give a total for revenues for some years. Equally problematic is that, with the long perspective of 
a time series, a multiplicity of data sources/providers has meant that the categorization for 
revenues and revenue sources does vary considerably. These data need to be deflated. Price and 
wage data are used to create a CPI that spans across the whole period.  
For imports and exports physical data can be obtained and so we can estimate constant 
prices for any given year. Quantities for imports have been difficult to obtain, in particular after 
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1975. Symptomatic of the issues relating to economic governance in African states in the 1980s, 
Statistical Abstracts cease to be available between the early 1980s and the late 1990s.  
Estimating ‘X’ 
The weakest part of the estimation is that growth arises—by definition—from growth in 
formal markets, while we are not certain of the opportunity cost of growth in such markets. How 
should the relationship between the formal or recorded sectors of the Nigerian economy be 
interpreted? Addressing this issue in 1966, Stolper wrote, “The absence of a Malthusian problem 
makes it illegitimate to neglect the so-called subsistence sector and to assume that any increase 
in output by ‘modern’ sectors is a net addition to total product.”61 Is this claim valid? For the 
whole period? It is precisely these questions that need addressing before we can interpret the 
figures which express formal/recorded or ‘modern’ economic growth in Nigeria. For more recent 
times there are household budget surveys available, which would give a fairly reliable estimate 
of the level of consumption, but still changes in production patterns are a matter of guesswork. 
Thus, these measured changes in the formal economy need to be complemented by 
qualitative analysis. The economic history, development and anthropology literatures on Nigeria 
have typically focussed particularly on two relationships. One is that between the export growth 
– or ‘modern sector’ growth – and how it relates to changes in food supply; the other is how 
changes in production have related to population growth and migration. There is not room to do 
the whole of the literature justice, but some of the most important arguments relating to 
particular times and areas in Nigeria are considered below. 
In particular, the literature has examined the extent to which classic economic models 
such as the vent-for-surplus and/or unlimited supply of labour apply to places like Nigeria. These 
debates are directly relevant as they are either explicitly or implicitly discussing whether the 
assumption of unlimited supply of labour applied and thus whether rural marginal productivity of 
labour was approaching zero or whether the opportunity cost of export growth was close to zero, 
as in the vent-for-surplus model. 
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A study by Martin of the Ngwa in south-east Nigeria offers a long-term perspective 
(1800–1980) on economic change relating to palm production for export. According to the trade 
statistics, there was a massive expansion in this period in exports of palm products. It is reported 
that exports of palm oil rose from 112 tons in 1807 to 23, 467 tons in 1847.62 In the study’s 
appendix, annual exports of palm kernels and oil are reported as increasing from 85,624 and 
45,508 to 327,174 and 139,204 tons between 1900 and 1948.63 Martin says “there was no switch 
from planting yams to planting palms” and that the palm production was carried out when labour 
was not required in food production. Furthermore, she writes, “we have no evidence of the kind 
of changes that would indicate strain.”64 Thus by 1900, an essentially yam- and hunting-based 
economy had been supplemented by a surplus of palm production. This surplus, however, was 
not easy to maintain.  
By 1920, the combined effect of increased colonial taxation and deteriorating prices 
meant that Igbo farmers were struggling to maintain their real incomes even with rapid increases 
in volumes. The expansion in production volumes was matched by increases in food imports and 
labour inflows to the region. Increasingly, as Martin reports, palm savings were invested outside 
the palm trade. Until 1950, population pressure in the region had been low, but from this point 
on, land for palm production was increasingly in competition for land with yam production. With 
the growing importance of petroleum in the Nigerian economy and demand from growing towns, 
cash from food production, in particular cassava, became a potential cash source. This potential 
could only be exploited by peasants with access to surplus land. Essentially, Martin argues that 
in eastern Nigeria the vent-for-surplus model applies in the 19
th
 century, perhaps as late as until 
1920. From 1950 onwards, there is a land scarcity and a gradual turn from production for the 
external to the domestic market.  
Hill gives us a picture of developments in the rural, northern parts of Nigeria, comparing 
two villages—one densely populated and one sparsely populated—in rural Kano, between 1900 
and 1970. “Past statistical records and documentary material are lacking” and therefore we are 
                                                          
62
 Martin, Palm Oil and Protest, p. 28. 
63
 Martin, Palm Oil and Protest, pp. 148–149. 
64
 Martin, Palm Oil and Protest, p. 34 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 13/2011        30 
 
left with tracing certain trends based on Hill’s judgement.65 In 1900, the rural economy of Kano 
was based on farm slavery and cash crop production for long-distance trade over a wide area in 
Central Sudan. The end of slavery probably meant depopulation between 1900 and 1930. The 
arrival of the railway meant a decline in textile production and increase in groundnut production 
for exports. Economic inequality and land scarcity varied hugely across locations, but in both 
places land was scarce, as evidenced by prices for it, which increased throughout the period. The 
implied structural changes meant that the colonial statistics on exports through the ports will 
overestimate economic change in the North in the aggregate, while ignoring structural change 
and the costs associated with this change in the domestic rural economy in northern Nigeria.  
Berry offers a study of economic change relating to cocoa production in western 
Nigeria.66 In particular, she emphasises the role of factor flows, labour and savings within the 
cocoa economy . Again, if the population censuses had been reliable, one could have assessed the 
role of migration. The census figures from 1953 and 1962 imply migration away from provinces 
with the largest urban centres and towards the areas which were predominantly rural. This is 
probably an error, as it is widely recognized that the basic pattern has been rural-to-urban 
migration. 
In the light of the evidence that I found of substantial migration to the eastern parts of the 
cocoa belt during this period however, it seems that the censuses may not, after all, give 
such a distorted picture of changes in the geographical distribution of the population—
however inaccurate their measurement of its over-all rate of growth.67  
 
Berry notes that pressures on land had so far been mitigated by migration to areas where 
land was available, but that land would soon become a constraint on agricultural expansion. 
Berry’s study stresses in particular the role of savings in linking urban and rural economies. The 
measures of formal economic growth are not picking up this source of capital formation.  
Taking a classic economic position, Helleiner explores economic growth in the first half 
of the 20
th
 century in Nigeria, from the starting point that “the Nigerian areas” in the late 1900s 
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were engaged primarily in ‘traditional’ activities.’68 In his view, the Nigerian economy was 
essentially ‘static’, and the ‘traditional’ output can be assumed to follow a secular trend in line 
with population, subject to variation due to weather, pests and other diseases.69 It was the 
external stimulus of the market that increased per capita incomes, according to these 
assumptions. Between 1900 and 1929, export volumes grew with an annual compound rate 
between 7 and 5.5 percent. Still, Helleiner asserts that the traditional economy accounted for 85 
percent in 1929, while export growth “provided incentives for a slight expansion of domestically 
consumed traditional output.”70 In addition, there was growth due to population increases. “It is 
generally assumed that Nigerian population was stationery during the first 25 years of this 
century, and then began to increase at a rate of about 0.6 percent for the next 15 years.” 
Consequently, “it has been postulated that the traditional output increased by 10 percent at best.” 
71 Obviously, to agree with this conclusion one would have to accept both the 1 to 1 relationship 
with food production and population growth and accept the colonial population data. 
In her study of Nigeria, Smith explicitly challenges the utility of the vent-for-surplus 
model. She summarizes some economic history studies of economic change in the 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century—in particular, the relationship between the export economy and the domestic 
economy. Smith emphasises the structural change that created the possibility of massive 
expansion in agricultural production for export. There was a contraction in indigenous 
manufacturing activity, and an urban-to-rural migration took place. The instigating factors were 
the advent of cheap European manufactures, the investment in infrastructure (in particular the 
arrival of the railroad to Kano) and finally, the push factor of the colonial introduction of a hut 
tax. Thus, Smith concludes, we cannot interpret the export growth as gaining “something for 
nothing.”72 
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Conclusion: Patterns of Continuity and Discontinuity in the Nigerian Colonial 
and Post-Colonial State 
Manning, in a review of Ekundare’s monograph on the economic history of Nigeria, 
wrote that the book was only valuable as a “compendium of official data on British intervention 
in the Nigerian economy” and that the accompanying analysis was a “celebratory narrative” of 
that intervention.. The only interpretative lines drawn out of the data presented are the assertion 
that the British government was the main stimulant of Nigerian economic growth.”73 When using 
these data on exports, imports, revenues and expenditure, we are measuring the growth of 
international trade and of government—neither of which should automatically be equated with 
development. Moreover, the most important question—how the growth of markets and states 
affects economic development—remains unanswered.  
A strengthening of the state in terms of revenue and expenditure has in Sub-Saharan 
Africa been directly related to external markets, as captured in Cooper’s phrase ‘the gatekeeper 
state’. Colonial Nigeria relied on earnings from its principal export commodities: palm kernels 
and oil, groundnuts, cocoa and tin ore. Between 1916 and 1938, these commodities cumulatively 
accounted for more than 80 percent of all export earnings, and kernels and oil from palm alone 
accounting for almost 50 percent of the earnings. There has been continuity in export 
dependence, but the relative importance of different commodities has changed. In 1958 crude oil 
exports commenced, and they soon came to dominate the export earnings. Apart from the 
appearance of more numerous and sophisticated capital goods, there is no clear trend to be 
observed on the import bill. Export earnings from petroleum boosted imports of foodstuffs, 
capital goods and government expenditure from the 1960s onwards, with a recession from the 
late 1970s to the 1990s. The dominance of petroleum coincides with the arrival of the 
agricultural crisis. Using the data sources presented here, it would seem possible to document 
how the Nigerian state has been able to pursue and temporarily succeed in bringing about some 
modernization, development and economic growth. The ‘X’ in our dataset is of course the crucial 
factor in estimating whether this has led to lasting improvements for the population at large.  
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There are some obvious discontinuities in measurement and data from the colonial to the 
post-colonial period, and some of these seriously constrain comparison through time, in 
particular with regard to the population growth data. The change from a colony mainly focused 
on a net wealth transfer to the colonial power to an independent state focused on increasing 
government expenditure and imports of capital goods is both borne out in the data presented here 
as well as indirectly affecting the data recording itself.  
This paper suggests a minimalistic method to measure change through the colonial and 
post-colonial periods. The method might strike the reader as crude or even misleading, as it does 
not include agricultural production other than indirectly capturing the export of agricultural 
commodities and the import of food commodities. So, what questions can it answer?  
The method suggested here has obvious limitations. Rather than answering the question 
“did Nigeria develop?”, the indicator suggested here measures development in a very particular 
sense, not productivity or living standards per se but modernization, defined as the growth of 
formal markets, the capacity of the state to tax and spend and the average Nigerian’s ability to 
export and import, thus participating in the formal economy and the world economy. The 
advantage of this indicator? It makes explicit the existing data limitations. It also establishes that 
in the 20
th
 century the Nigerian state, colonial or post-colonial, has overseen a massive growth in 
formal markets and increases in development expenditure.  
This is a first exploratory paper in a research project aiming to create measures of 
economic growth across the 20
th
 century for a sample of African economies. Until recently most 
of economists’ work on Africa has taken 1960 as the starting point, because data on national 
income and similar derivates are only available back to 1960. This neglect of earlier periods is 
increasingly seen as a weakness, because it does not allow an analysis of historical roots of 
poverty or of persistent slow growth. The past ten years have seen a surge in quantitative 
research on African development that attempts to establish relationships between historical 
events and income levels and inequalities today. This work has been dubbed “the New Economic 
History of Africa” by Hopkins.74 For this research agenda to be fruitful or its theories 
substantiated, it is crucial to have consistent and reliable estimates of economic change. The 
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sources for the creation of long term datasets on African economies exist, but these valuable 
colonial data remain underutilized. To date the quantitative literature on Africa has made heroic 
leaps of faith, asserting causal relationships across time periods, without being able to account 
for different trajectories of economic development. Meanwhile historical national accounts are 
now being constructed for European countries and other regions far back in time. If Africa is not 
to be marginalized in global economic studies, and if we are to understand the relative 
importance of historical events for African development today, similar reconstructive research 
needs to be undertaken, for as many countries as feasible.  
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